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A
number of years ago in Lubbock, Texas, where the three authors once lived,
the market was served solely by community banks, each with a different
strategic focus and emphasis. The relative tranquility of this banking land-
scape changed when the largest community bank in town was acquired by a large
bank holding company.
Soon after the acquisition announcement, one of the authors was visiting the
CEO of a local bank. The author wondered if the large bank holding company’s
presence would be viewed as a serious competitive threat by the community banks
in Lubbock. Surprisingly, the CEO saw the acquisition as a great opportunity for his
bank. First, he felt he would be able to hire many of the better lending officers from
the acquired bank because they would feel too constrained by the limits put on
their discretion to make lending decisions and by similar problems associated with
large bureaucratic organizations. Second, he thought that many of the acquired
bank’s loan customers might leave the acquired bank once their lending officer left,
so his bank’s loan portfolio could grow if his bank could attract these customers.
Finally, the CEO felt that many of the acquired bank’s depositors would become
frustrated by the lack of personal attention and thus seek to bank elsewhere. If his
bank could attract these depositors, funding the anticipated loan growth would not
pose a serious problem.
Many of these predictions came true over the next few years. The community
bank CEO hired several lending officers from the acquired bank, and many loan cus-
tomers moved their business with these officers. Deposits also grew, so funding
problems were no more a problem there than elsewhere. Indeed, so many of these
predictions came true that the authors realized that community banks may do
things differently than large bank holding companies. The purpose of this article is
to further explain and explore the uniqueness of community banks.
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What Are Community Banks?
To many outsiders all banks are alike. They accept deposits and make loans. The
banking industry, in turn, is often viewed as a uniform competitor with nonbank
financial services companies. However, to insiders there are many variations among
banks, with the distinction between community banks and all other banks being one
of the most important. 
As the name suggests, community banks focus their activities on local commu-
nities, gathering deposits and lending within a restricted trade area rather than oper-
ating in regional or national markets. Because of their narrow focus, these banks are
generally smaller. In fact, many market participants label banks with less than $1 bil-
lion in assets as community banks. 
Bankers not only view community banks as being far different from large bank-
ing organizations but also draw important distinctions between different types of
community banks. For example, the banking industry sponsors many trade associa-
tions, with some devoted strictly to com-
munity banks. Most states have associa-
tions for independent (community) banks,
whose members are typically the smallest
institutions, in addition to a state bankers
association, which generally draws mem-
bers from all size banks. As another illus-
tration, when evaluating community bank
performance, most bankers and analysts
compare performance across banks of
similar size that operate in similar geo-
graphic markets with the same general strategies. In fact, the uniform bank perfor-
mance report set up by the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council
(FFIEC) selects peer institutions for banks on the basis of size.
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Policymakers also often focus their attention narrowly on community banks. For
example, because community banks are associated with small business lending, local
community development, and direct customer contact, policymakers have worried
whether such banks will be able to survive threats brought by consolidation of the
banking industry. Implicitly, policymakers worry whether consolidation will reduce
the availability of credit to small businesses and impose rising fees on consumers.
2
While the banking industry has experienced dramatic changes over the past
twenty years, community banks have survived and in many cases prospered.
Regulatory changes during this period include geographic deregulation, with the pas-
sage of the Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency (Riegle-Neal) Act of 1994
and the general elimination of restrictions against interstate and intrastate banking,
and branching and product deregulation with the passage of the Financial Services
Modernization (Gramm-Leach-Bliley) Act in 1999. The last twenty years have also
witnessed extraordinary technological changes, which have directly affected the
banking industry.
3 Amid these changes, many community banks have flourished
financially (see Bassett and Brady 2001), and de novo banks continue to enter the
scene to the surprise of many who expected greater consolidation of small banks
resulting from significant scale and scope economies in banking.
4 Many factors and
circumstances argue against the long-term success of community banks: excessive
concentration of risk in lending; competitive pressures from deregulation and new
technologies; and limitations on market power, brand recognition, and technological
investment (see Berger 2003). Their size presumably prevents smaller banks from
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Because community banks are associated
with small business lending, local com-
munity development, and direct customer
contact, policymakers have worried
whether such banks will be able to survive
threats brought by consolidation of the
banking industry.adequately diversifying credit risk and prevents management from investing suffi-
ciently in new technologies to compete effectively.
5 According to aggregate data,
most large banks are becoming more cost efficient in their operations while smaller
banks are not, making it more difficult for smaller banks to offer a sufficiently broad
range of services at competitive prices (see FDIC 2002). These latter factors limit the
growth in noninterest income, an attractive and stable source of future earnings.
On the other hand, there are many reasons why community banks are flourishing.
First, community bank managers seem to process information differently than man-
agers of larger banks, placing a greater emphasis on long-term customer relationships.
The relatively smaller size of community banks, along with more local ownership,
allows them to give more decision-making authority to bank employees, which further
allows these banks to exploit “soft” information.
6 Widespread mergers and acquisitions
among larger banking organizations enhance this difference and drive many cus-
tomers who seek nonstandard and personal banking services to community institu-
tions. Second, the recent availability of relatively low-cost Federal Home Loan Bank
(FHLB) advances as a funding source has reduced funding constraints on qualifying
community banks in growth markets. FHLB advances allow small banks to better com-
pete with large banks on the basis of price. Third, many community banks have sub-
stantial credit exposure to customers involved in agriculture. Recent programs have
expanded federal guarantees and agriculture payments, which improve overall credit
performance and quality. Finally, since 1997 many community banks have elected to
be taxed as Subchapter S corporations, thereby avoiding corporate income taxes and
directly increasing aggregate profitability. At the time of this study, the “Sub S” option
was not available to firms with more than seventy-five shareholders.
7
The primary purpose of this article is to explore differences between commu-
nity banks and larger banks and to describe certain differences among community
banks. Understanding these differences is important to students of the U.S. financial
system, to participants in the banking industry, and to policymakers who regulate
depository institutions. 
We initially summarize recent academic literature that tries to identify the unique
aspects of community banking. In doing so, we distinguish between relationship
banking, which we associate with community banks, and transactional banking,
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1. Beginning in March 2004, the FFIEC selects peer group banks in the following asset size categories:
less than $50 million, $50 million to $100 million, $100 million to $300 million, $300 million to
$1 billion, $1 billion to $3 billion, and all banks above $3 billion.
2. Federal Reserve Bank surveys consistently show that large banking organizations charge higher
fees than community banks do and have increased their fees more over time (see Hannan 2002).
Berger and Udell (2002) and Scott and Dunkelberg (2004) provide evidence that credit service
and availability for small business firms is better at community banks than at large banks.
3. Berger and Mester (2003) and Allen, McAndrews, and Strahan (2002) provide discussions on tech-
nological change and banking.
4. DeYoung and Hasan (1998) and DeYoung (1999) discuss and present evidence on de novo banks.
5. Yeager (2004) provides evidence that the geographic concentration risk that community banks
must bear is not responsible for the declining numbers of community banks in the United States.
6. Information can be differentiated as being “hard” or “soft.” Hard information consists of easily
verifiable facts that can be credibly shared. Soft information consists of the opinions of one indi-
vidual who knows the person whose information is being evaluated. Many argue that community
banks are better equipped to produce soft information than are larger banks. See, for example,
Berger and Udell (2002), Scott (2004), and Scott and Dunkelberg (2004).
7. The limit on the number of shareholders was increased from seventy-five to one hundred by the
American Jobs Creation Tax Act of 2004.
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA 18 ECONOMIC REVIEW First Quarter 2005
which we associate with larger banking entities, and discuss the different hierarchies
of decision making in the two types of institutions. This line of inquiry suggests that
banks of various asset sizes conduct business in very different ways. Community
banks, in particular, appear to have quite different strategic orientations. For exam-
ple, they are afforded unique ways to manage their taxes and appear to rely much less
on noninterest income than do the largest banks in the country. 
We then examine profit and risk measures for the 1998–2002 period for commu-
nity banks of different sizes and large banking organizations, thus providing evidence
that community banks differ in many ways from their larger banking brethren.
8 Our anal-
ysis considers why community banks have different focuses and identifies key factors
that are associated with strong financial performance across different strategies.
9
The Unique Role of Community Banks
This section summarizes recent contributions to the understanding of the unique role
that community banks play in financial intermediation and outlines key characteristics
of these intermediaries. For years academics have argued that banks exist because
significant costs are associated with bringing lenders and borrowers together and
some participants do not have sufficient information about counterparties in bor-
rowing arrangements. As financial intermediaries, banks facilitate transactions by
reducing costs and increasing the amount of information available. As a result, banks
stimulate economic development.
At least two general arguments support the conventional wisdom that community
banks cannot adequately compete with larger banking organizations and that further
industry consolidation is inevitable. The first relates to the primary function of an inter-
mediary—gathering, collecting, analyzing, and disseminating information. It is generally
assumed that larger organizations can more cheaply access valuable information and
thus better facilitate transactions. But dramatic advances in technology have made gath-
ering and analyzing information less costly and therefore have reduced the value of an
intermediary.
10 The second argument is that economies of scale and scope enable larger
banks to reduce costs of providing services. Interestingly, academic research provides
conflicting evidence on whether or not significant cost differentials exist for large versus
small banks or for banks that offer more product lines than other banks (Berger and
Humphrey 1999). As a result, there is little agreement about what size bank or what
banking organizational structure provides the greatest efficiency.
Strategic focus: Relationship banking versus transactional banking.
Arguments suggesting that large banks will dominate banking assume that all financial
intermediaries collect and analyze information in the same way. Some have questioned
the validity of this treatment. Sharpe (1990), Diamond (1991), and Rajan (1992), among
others, emphasize a distinction between transactional banking and relationship banking,
implicitly suggesting that not all intermediation is the same. Transactional banking is
primarily the provision of intermediation services, the gathering of deposits and exten-
sion of loans. Because these transactional products are highly standardized, they require
little human input to manage and involve information that is generally easily available
and reliable. Thus, in transactional banking hard information drives performance.
Relationship banking, in contrast, generally involves the use of soft information,
which is not readily available or easily quantifiable. Soft information requires more
human input and evaluation and is acquired primarily by working one-on-one with
the banking customer. For example, lenders obtain soft information through special
efforts directed at prospective borrowers. Relationship banking also frequently
involves more than facilitating the movement of funds from lenders to borrowers.
11 In
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accounting, business planning, and tax planning expertise. Relationship banking also
generally requires localized decision making. Because relationship banking attempts
to exploit soft information that is difficult to assess and evaluate, the loan officer
must be given the latitude and ability to act on this information without the approval
of numerous others. This approach has important implications for the ownership
structure of the bank, which we will address shortly.
While all types of lending entail some relational aspects, relationship lending is
typically perceived to be the strongest for small businesses, agriculture customers,
and retail consumers. Frame, Srinivansan, and Woosley (2001) provide evidence that
large banks have increasingly used credit scoring—the process of incorporating hard
information as inputs to quantitative models that are used to make accept/reject
decisions—to increase their small business lending. Credit scoring is somewhat
mechanical and involves less human input, thereby lowering the unit cost of making
a loan. To the extent that loans to small businesses, agriculture customers, and indi-
viduals can be successfully credit scored over time, community banks will face
increasing competition in their loan portfolios because they may not be able to com-
pete with larger banks on price. However, the use of credit scoring systems generally
does not allow the provision of real value from the banker, as described above.
Large banks have similarly concentrated decision making among fewer entities,
with credit approval from analysts far removed from the borrower. In turn, large
banks offer the most attractive rates to their most profitable customers as deter-
mined by comprehensive customer profitability models that often incorporate both
business and personal account information. Less profitable customers often are given
access to a reduced level of service and pay higher fees and rates. Many customers
do not need or want a broad array of credit, deposit, insurance, and trust services
from their bank. They value the intimate knowledge their banker has of their business
and/or total relationship and prefer dealing consistently with the same individuals
whom they do not have to frequently reeducate about their own unique financial and
business situations. Such customers are consequently willing to pay relatively more
for such service. Relationship lending thus provides a niche for community institu-
tions that many large banks find less attractive or are less capable of providing (see
Berger and Udell 1995, 2002; Scott and Dunkelberg 2004). 
In many smaller companies, financial statements are not standardized and man-
agement lacks the financial expertise needed to be a direct participant in the financial
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8. Even community banks can differ from each other in strategic focus. For example, a later discus-
sion distinguishes between community banks that focus on the deposit side of the balance sheet
and those that focus on the lending side.
9. Although this article does not directly address the future of community banking, the issue is obvi-
ously related to our investigation. For those interested in this issue, see DeYoung (2003), which
provides a summary of the 2003 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Research Conference “Whither
the Community Bank?” Many conference participants were surprisingly upbeat about the future
of community banking, an inference consistent with the arguments expressed in this article.
10. Petersen and Rajan (2002), for example, provide evidence that small businesses are now better
able to borrow from more physically distant lenders than they were in the past.
11. DeYoung, Hunter, and Udell (2003) discuss relationship lending from the perspective of bankers
having access to soft information acquired through personal contact with the borrower. While we
do not disagree that this element is important to relationship banking at community banks, our
definition is broader, emphasizing that the lender may be additionally providing value associated
with tax, accounting, and other expertise as well as funds.
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markets. By definition, lenders to these companies need to evaluate soft information in
making a credit decision. Banks may also aggressively market or cross-sell noncredit
products and services to such customers in order to lock in or enhance the relation-
ship. The familiarity between borrower and lender and the convenience of completing
transactions without beginning the information search anew encourages both the bank
and customer to maintain the relationship over time.
Relationship lending and bank asset size. The typical bank engages in both
types of lending—transactional and relationship—because the two types are not nec-
essarily substitutes for each other. Still, large commercial banks are likely to be more
transaction oriented while smaller, community banks are more relationship focused.
Berger and Udell (2002) argue that banks offering relationship lending must delegate
more lending authority to their loan officers than do banks that focus on transactional
lending and that small banks are better able to resolve problems associated with del-
egating authority than large banks are. Thus, small community banks are better
equipped to engage in relationship lending than large banks are. Transactional bank-
ing is generally associated with economies of scale because unit costs fall with
increasing bank size. If all a bank does is provide funds for borrowers, spreading fixed
costs over more borrowers is likely to result in a lower cost per customer. Hence,
larger banks are more attracted to credit scoring and loan securitizations (see Pilloff
and Rhoades 2000). Because any asset with standardized features can be credit
scored and securitized, large banks likely securitize a greater portion of their loans
and leases than smaller banks do. Investors can examine the pooled assets’ credit
scores to assess risk and readily establish prices for these standardized instruments
to generate reasonable risk-adjusted returns. Thus, to the extent that more
economies of scale and scope exist in transactional banking, larger banks can be
expected to focus more on transactional banking, which, in turn, is likely to result in
continued consolidation in the banking industry.
Relationship deposit gathering. In addition to relationship lending, many
community banks attempt to build and exploit deposit relationships. (See the side-
bar on page 21 for a comparison of deposit-driven and loan-driven banks.) Such efforts
help differentiate their services from those of larger institutions. On the other hand,
many large banks have tried to eliminate much of the human touch in banking in an
effort to minimize transaction costs. The unit costs associated with ATM usage, tele-
phone banking, and Internet banking are well below those for live teller transactions.
At many large banks, customers who open new deposit accounts can often receive
reduced minimum balance requirements or lower service charges if they agree to
conduct business electronically rather than physically enter a bank office. The banks
are attempting to attract customers to the lowest-cost delivery systems via lower
prices. In contrast, community banks conduct more business via human interaction
at higher unit cost. Thus, we would expect to see that large banks have less by way
of core deposits and pay more explicit interest on deposits, on average.
According to these arguments, there is little reason to expect greater cost advan-
tages resulting from increased institution size in relationship banking, which is much
more likely to be niche driven. If a bank is providing value to a borrower beyond basic
credit services, the customer will be willing to pay for the service. Community banks
that provide relationship banking services are more likely to find profit-making
opportunities regardless of their asset size because competition for these services is
likely to be limited.
12
The relative importance of interest income and noninterest income.
Another important distinction between a community bank and other banks relates to
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA the relative importance of different sources of revenue. With their emphasis on rela-
tionship banking, community banks are expected to have relatively larger net inter-
est margins because their loan customers are willing to pay higher interest rates to
obtain nonstandardized credits and their depositors are willing to accept lower
explicit interest rates, on average, because of the personal touch. Large banks that
do little relationship lending will have smaller margins because proportionately more
of their assets and liabilities are priced like commodities. 
DeYoung and Rice (2004) show that large banks generate proportionately more
noninterest income as a fraction of operating revenue than smaller community banks
do. Greater noninterest income reflects two phenomena. First, fees are tied closely
to transactions activity. Banks that make and then securitize loans generate fee
income. For large transaction-oriented banks, noninterest income is often a more
important source of revenue than interest income. Second, operating with reduced
(relative) credit exposure frees up capital to invest in nontraditional, fee-based busi-
nesses. Many large banks have diversified their operations from traditional lending
toward insurance and investment banking, which generate fee income rather than
net interest income. DeYoung and Rice provide evidence that community banks that
have tried to generate more noninterest income have encountered more volatile
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12. We recognize that focusing on asset size ignores off-balance-sheet commitments and exposures, but
we continue the tradition in the banking literature of using asset size as the benchmark of economic/
financial size. See Clark and Siems (2002) for a detailed examination of such off-balance-sheet
activities and the impact of evidence regarding efficiencies or inefficiencies in banking.
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C
ommunity banks’ strategic objectives are
greatly influenced by ownership structure
and the geographic markets in which the banks
compete. In particular, some community banks
focus on building franchise value via deposits.
Many are family-owned and managed and do not
want to take on high credit risk for fear of losing
the implicit annuity associated with a steady
stream of earnings. Other such banks operate in
geographic markets with limited growth oppor-
tunities, such as rural communities with a
declining population and no local business
expansion, and are unwilling to take the risks
associated with growth outside their core trade
area. Regardless of the motivating force, such
deposit-driven banks typically operate with high
ratios of core deposits to assets and low ratios of
loans to assets. While their average cost of funds
is low, the average asset yield is also low given
the relatively heavy reliance on securities. The
net interest margin is generally lower but more
stable over time while noninterest expense is
low as a fraction of assets. 
In contrast, other community banks build
franchise value primarily on the lending side of
the business. Loans typically offer the highest
promised yields before taxes and expenses, and
managers can increase profits faster by increas-
ing credit exposure. Such banks either operate
in high growth markets or are willing to expand
operations via branching, de novo entry, or acqui-
sition. Such loan-driven banks operate with high
ratios of loans to assets and low ratios of core
deposits to assets because they rely propor-
tionately more on purchased liabilities to fund
loan growth. Access to Federal Home Loan Bank
advances has allowed these banks to continue
growing rather than restricting growth to the
pace of core deposit growth. Net interest margins
are typically greater, as is noninterest expense
as a fraction of assets. These banks further differ-
entiate themselves by the loans that management
emphasizes. Clearly, banks that lend primarily to
small commercial businesses differ from those
that deal primarily with agriculture borrowers or
mortgage customers.
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earnings and, in fact, have found a poor risk-return trade-off in developing many of
these lines of business. This evidence suggests that large, transaction-oriented banks
are more capable of generating noninterest income than are smaller community
banks. Moreover, a smaller community bank may be doing shareholders a disservice
in trying to generate this type of business.
Ownership differences. Most small bank stock is privately held rather than
publicly traded while large bank stock is generally publicly traded. Thus, the owner-
ship of small banks is more concentrated in the hands of fewer stockholders while the
ownership of large banks is widely dis-
persed. In addition, ownership is more
concentrated at small banks, and owners
are more actively involved in managing the
banks. For example, Brickley, Linck, and
Smith (2003) show that small bank owner-
ship in Texas is much more concentrated
than it is for large banks: Officers and
directors of small banks owned roughly
two-thirds of their banks’ stock while the officers and directors of the large banks in
their sample owned only about one-quarter of the stock. 
The fact that local decision makers in small banks own relatively more stock in
the banks and are more actively involved in the banks’ management mitigates agency
problems. Brickley, Linck, and Smith argue that this setup allows smaller banks to
grant local managers more decision authority. Allowing the person who acquires soft
information on a borrower to act upon the information makes it easier for smaller
banks to engage in relationship lending. This line of reasoning is similar to that of
Berger and Udell (2002), who argue that stockholders in large banks, who are more
dispersed and not local, are less willing to grant decision-making authority to local
managers and prefer instead to use more bureaucratic rules for decision making.
Tax differences. A final distinction among community banks is their federal
income tax status. In 1996 Congress passed the Small Business Job Protection Act,
which allowed insured banks to choose to be taxed as S corporations effective in 1997.
Because S corporations do not pay federal corporate income taxes, income is trans-
ferred directly to stockholders with significant tax savings. For tax purposes, S corpo-
rations are treated as partnerships, with income allocated to stockholders based on the
number of shares held. To qualify for Subchapter S status, a bank must be headquartered
in the United States and cannot have more than seventy-five stockholders (recently
increased to one hundred shareholders in 2004), and each stockholder must be an
individual, an estate, a qualified plan, or a specific type of tax-exempt organization.
Nonresident aliens cannot be stockholders in Sub S banks. In addition, each bank can have
only one class of stock and cannot use the reserve method for accounting for loan losses.
The Subchapter S status effectively allows the corporation to transfer all income for
federal tax purposes to shareholders and have no income tax obligation itself. However,
because the act limits the number of shareholders to seventy-five or less, not all banks
choose this unique tax status. As we have seen, large banks are generally publicly traded
with numerous shareholders and thus are precluded from selecting Subchapter S status.
Community banks have far more concentrated ownership and therefore have greater
flexibility in selecting Subchapter S status. Through March 2004, 2,137 FDIC-insured
banks had selected Subchapter S status. Indeed, approximately 20 percent of all banks
with less than $100 million in assets have selected Subchapter S status. On the other
hand, less than 2 percent of all banks with more than $1 billion in assets have done so.
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Community banks appear to differ in
their emphasis on human-aided transac-
tions on the lending and deposit side, in
their interest versus noninterest income
sources, and in their ownership structure
as well as possible tax differences.The choice of Sub S status imposes specific constraints on a bank’s operating
strategy. Specifically, with only seventy-five shareholders, Sub S banks generally have
limited access to new capital. To fund growth, they must rely on retained earnings
and external capital raised via new equity offerings to existing stockholders or use
trust-preferred stock offerings. Each source of new capital is limited over time and
thus potentially constrains growth opportunities. Eventually, growth constraints may
lead to different risk and return profiles.
Summary of the uniqueness of community banks. Much evidence suggests
that community banks do business in ways that are very different from those of larger
banking institutions. Community banks appear to differ in their emphasis on human-
aided transactions on the lending and deposit side, in their interest versus noninterest
income sources, and in their ownership structure as well as possible tax differences. The
distinction between transactional banking and relationship banking might explain why
academic studies find conflicting evidence on the existence of significant economies of
scale in banking and why some bankers appear to think there are significant size advan-
tages while others do not see much advantage due to increased size. If, as we have
argued, transactional banking results in cost savings as bank size increases but relation-
ship banking does not, we would expect to find some evidence of cost efficiencies in the
first but not the latter. This distinction might also explain why some bankers anticipate
great benefits from consolidation while others spend considerable energy and resources
starting up de novo banks. The data in Table 1 indicate that, during the merger mania
of the late 1990s, the relationship between mergers and de novo formations has been
fairly steady, averaging about three mergers for every start-up bank over the last seven
years. We contend that larger banks, especially those more interested in mergers, are
likely focused relatively more on transactional banking and that smaller banks, such as
de novo banks, are likely focused relatively more on relationship banking.
Unfortunately, information regarding the banking industry does not readily dis-
tinguish between these two strategic pursuits. In the following analysis, we analyze
key performance ratios using data from the 1998–2002 period and present evidence
consistent with our distinction between relationship banking and transactional bank-
ing. We essentially assume that community banks, being smaller in asset size, represent
relationship banking and larger banks represent transactional banking.
Examining Differences between Community Banks and Larger Banks
In the following analysis, we compare key financial ratios characterizing aggregate
profitability and risk across different-sized banks. Specifically, we examine key ratios
for commercial banks across different asset size categories for the period 1998–2002
period. We consider a five-year period to assure that our findings are not driven by
cyclical events. The fact that the 1998–2002 period includes both economic expansion
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Table 1
The Relationship between Mergers and New Charters: Commercial Banks and Savings Banks
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
New charters 199 217 268 223 145 94 119
Mergers 725 671 497 535 421 336 275
Percent of new charters to mergers 27.5 32.3 53.9 41.7 34.4 28.0 43.3
Source: FDIC, Quarterly Banking Profile, 1997–200324 ECONOMIC REVIEW First Quarter 2005
and contraction is reassuring on this point. The data examined are for all FDIC-
insured commercial banks and thrifts in operation during the year in question. The
data are from Sheshunoff Information Services Inc., BankSearch, and the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) (www.fdic.gov). 
We distinguish between banks across six asset-size categories: those with assets of
less than $100 million, $100 million to $300 million, $300 million to $500 million, $500
million to $1 billion, $1 billion to $10 billion, and more than $10 billion.
13 The general
demarcation for community banks is $1 billion in asset size, but we provide finer detail
to further expand comparisons. To underscore tax-related differences, we separate
banks that chose Subchapter S status from those taxed as C corporations on a year-by-
year basis. Finally, we further distinguish loan-driven banks from deposit-driven banks
according to each bank’s average loan-to-asset ratio. Specifically, banks with an average
loan-to-asset ratio of at least 60 percent, the approximate median in each year, are des-
ignated as loan-driven banks with all other banks designated as deposit-driven.
14
Table 2 documents the number of banks that fall within each category. The great-
est number of banks had under $100 million in assets, and most banks paid taxes as
C corporations. Fewer than eighty banks had more than $10 billion in assets, and
none claimed Subchapter S tax status. Not surprisingly, given the restrictions on the
number of shareholders, the smaller the bank, the greater the proportion of banks
that selected Sub S status. For the smallest asset size grouping, more than 20 per-
cent of the banks in the sample were classified as Sub S as opposed to C corporations.
Similarly, as asset size increases up to $1 billion, an increasing proportion of banks
were loan-driven. Thus, there are only fifteen deposit-driven banks in our sample
that are Subchapter S and have more than $300 million in assets. We provide medi-
ans for certain ratios in these six asset-size groupings. Readers should be aware that
some of these medians are determined for a small number of banks, especially for
Subchapter S banks with asset size greater than $500 million.
In the following analysis, we initially calculate an average value for each ratio for
each bank in the sample over the five years. We report median values of these aver-
age ratios in order to minimize the impact of data outliers.
15
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Table 2
Sample Banks by Size, Tax Status, and Loan-to-Asset Ratio: 
1998–2002, Millions of Dollars
$100M– $300M– $500M– $1B–
<$100M $300M $500M $1B $10B >$10B
Total 4,810 2,329 473 317 320 78
Sub S 1,037 333 38 22 6 0
Non-Sub S 3,773 1,996 435 295 314 78
Loan-driven (percent) 50.80 64.50 69.30 69.40 64.10 69.20
Sub S 529 212 31 15 5 0
Non-Sub S 1,914 1,290 297 205 200 54
Deposit-driven (percent) 49.20 35.50 30.70 30.60 35.90 30.80
Sub S 508 121 7710
Non-Sub S 1,859 706 138 90 114 24
Source: BankSearch; Sheshunoff Information Services Inc.Key Performance and Risk Measures across Banks of Different Asset Sizes 
Analysts have long recognized that fundamental differences exist between the oper-
ating profiles of community banks and large banking organizations. In terms of fund-
ing sources, small banks rely proportionately more on core deposits while large banks
rely more on purchased liabilities. Small banks, in turn, make loans primarily to small
businesses, consumers, and agriculture customers and are more dependent on net
interest margin while large banks generally emphasize large commercial customers,
large-volume credit card and indirect consumer lending, and international customers
(emphasizing transactional banking). Finally, the largest banks typically structure
operations around lines of business, emphasizing noncredit products and services
that generate fee income. Community banks get the bulk of their noninterest income
from deposit service charges and have little noninterest income from other sources.
The purpose of this section is to document some of the more important differences
between banks of different asset size. 
Banks that follow different operating strategies have fundamentally different prof-
itability and risk profiles, on average. The following analysis initially documents key dif-
ferences in aggregate profitability measures between community banks with less than
$1 billion in assets and larger banks and among community banks of different asset
sizes. Throughout the analysis, we separate Subchapter S banks from non-Subchapter S
banks because of differences in tax treatment and the possibility that growth constraints
might alter a Subchapter S bank’s tolerance for risk. We then examine select risk ratios
to assess the risk bearing done by the various banking institutions.
Aggregate profitability: Return on assets and return on equity. Figures 1
and 2 present the respective median returns on equity (ROEs) and returns on assets
(ROAs) for the different categories of banks. Loan-driven banks are banks with an
average loan-to-asset ratio of at least 60 percent, the approximate median in each
year, while all other banks are designated as deposit-driven. 
Three important observations relate to the patterns of ROEs among banks in
Figure 3. First, within each asset-size category, Subchapter S banks have greater
ROEs than their corresponding C corporate institutions.
16 This result is not surprising
because Subchapter S corporations have no direct tax obligations, so their net income
should be higher, ceteris paribus. While the result is not surprising, it does caution
against looking at all banks together, regardless of their corporate structure. To the
extent that smaller banks have a greater proportion of Subchapter S structures, ROEs
for small banks would be artificially inflated if one did not distinguish between C cor-
porate and Subchapter S banks. For the smallest size category, C corporate banks
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13. Another important distinction among commercial banks is whether or not they operate in
metropolitan areas. In our analysis we do not distinguish banks on this difference not because we
do not believe that this distinction is important but because we found it expedient to narrow the
focus of attention. We have some preliminary evidence that banks have different performance
and risk characteristics depending upon whether or not they operate in a metropolitan area. We
would be happy to provide this evidence to interested readers upon request. 
14. Because our analysis is primarily focused on banks with different operating strategies, deter-
mined by various asset sizes, the 60 percent loan-to-asset ratio was selected for the full sample
of banks, not for a particular size category.
15. The use of medians eliminates distortions caused by extreme values. For example, Merrill Lynch
Bank reports substantial loans but virtually no deposits. Its loan-to-deposit ratio is thus large,
inflating the average ratio for the sample of similar-sized banks.
16. We make no distinction as to whether or not the differences in ratios are statistically significant,
preferring to focus on relative and economic values.
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have median ROEs less than 10 percent while Subchapter S banks have ROEs
closer to 15 percent. Importantly, the peer groups formed by the FFIEC in com-
paring banks under the Uniform Bank Performance Report do not distinguish
banks by tax status but lump all banks together regardless of tax status. Second,
ROE generally increases with asset size. Thus, we see the incentive to grow asset
size regardless of corporate structure. Third, loan-driven banks appear to have
higher ROEs than those of deposit-driven banks when corporate structure and
asset size are controlled for.





































































































































Return on Average Equity, 1998–2002




































































































































Return on Average Assets, 1998–2002
Source: BankSearch; Sheshunoff Information Services Inc.All in all, the data in Figure 1 suggest that not all banks perform similarly in
terms of ROE. Analysts would be best served by distinguishing banks in terms of their
corporate structure, asset size, and loan-driven versus deposit-driven strategic focuses.
Moreover, the evidence suggests that the smaller banks in the sample might be viewed
as operating somewhat at a competitive disadvantage because their ROEs are rela-
tively small. However, we question this view as we examine further differences.
Not all of the patterns observed regarding ROE carry over to ROA, as Figure 2
shows. But one pattern as related to corporate structure differences is consistent.
Specifically, Subchapter S banks continue to have higher ROAs than their C corpo-
rate counterparts as the tax differences continue to have a significant effect. Still, the
other patterns in Figure 1 are not as strong. For example, asset size does not appear
as strong in driving ROA higher. While there is a general tendency for ROA to rise
with asset size, controlling for other factors, the positive association is not universal.
For example, for deposit-driven banks, the largest asset category does not have the
largest ROA. Also, loan-driven banks no longer dominate in terms of ROA perfor-
mance over deposit-driven banks. In fact, Figure 2 shows several cases in which the
median ROA for deposit-driven banks exceeds the median for comparable loan-
driven banks.
Financial leverage. It is important to remember that ROE reflects both the abil-
ity to generate a return on invested assets (ROA) and the use of financial leverage.
The latter is determined by the comparative amounts of debt and equity financing in
a bank’s capital structure and is characterized by the firm’s equity multiplier (EM).
Note that
ROE = ROA x EM,
where ROE is equal to net income/total (average) stockholders’ equity, ROA is equal
to net income/total (average) assets, and EM is equal to total (average) assets/total
(average) stockholders’ equity.
27 ECONOMIC REVIEW First Quarter 2005






































































































































Total Equity Capital to Average Total Assets, 1998–2002
Source: BankSearch; Sheshunoff Information Services Inc.28 ECONOMIC REVIEW First Quarter 2005
Median equity-to-asset (leverage) ratios, the inverse of EM, for our various bank
classifications appear in Figure 3. For C Corp banks, the equity ratio generally declines
consistently with asset size, indicating that the associated EM increases with size.
Thus, the larger the bank is, the greater the multiplier effect of financial leverage on
ROE. Smaller banks operate with the highest ratio of equity capital to total assets, pos-
sibly reflecting their limited diversification and ownership structure more closely tied
to family-owned institutions. The lower leverage, in turn, partially explains why aggre-
gate ROEs are lower, ceteris paribus, for community banks than for larger banks. In
other words, the lower ROEs observed for smaller banks appear due in part to the
desire to employ relatively less financial leverage. Smaller banks appear to prefer less
risk and pay for this with slightly lower ROEs. There is no evidence, however, to indi-
cate that this trade-off accepted by small banks is inferior to the trade-off taken by
their larger brethren. Carter, McNulty, and Verbrugge (2004) find evidence that smaller
banks earn greater risk-adjusted yields than do larger banks. These results suggest
that the lack of credit diversification is not a serious handicap for community banks
and that these banks might be better equipped to make good lending choices because
they have an information advantage relative to the larger banks.
Importantly, the difference in leverage is large for deposit-driven banks but
much lower for different-sized loan-driven banks. While small loan-driven banks still
report the highest equity-to-asset ratios, these ratios are only modestly higher than
those for larger banks. Sub S banks with assets between $300 million and $500 mil-
lion reported the lowest equity-to-asset ratios and thus the highest EMs among such
tax-advantaged banks.
Net interest margin. Figure 4 documents differences in median net interest mar-
gins (NIMs), net interest income divided by earning assets, across banks in different size
categories based on tax status and whether they are loan driven or deposit driven.
17 Two
strong relationships are evident. First, from 1998 to 2002, net interest margin medians
for loan-driven banks always exceeded the medians for deposit-driven banks, regardless
of size and tax status. The greater NIM for loan-driven banks is not surprising given that




































































































































Net Interest Margin to Average Total Assets, 1998–2002
Source: BankSearch; Sheshunoff Information Services Inc.loans carry higher promised yields and banks with greater holdings of loans should
operate with higher margins (provisions for loan losses). Over the sample period, loan-
driven banks reported median loan-to-asset ratios near 70 percent while deposit-driven
banks reported medians around 49 percent. The cumulative NIM effect is partially
offset by the lower average cost of funds associated with deposit-driven banks’ greater
funding from core deposits (evidence of this point is provided below). Thus, the differ-
ences in NIMs are lower for the smallest banks and increase with size. 
Second, the median NIMs are virtually the same for all Subchapter S banks, regard-
less of size, while NIM falls with size for C Corp banks. The decline for C Corp banks is
particularly dramatic for deposit-driven banks with more than $500 million in assets and
loan-driven banks with more than $10 billion in assets. For example, the median NIM is
30–40 basis points lower for the largest loan-driven C Corp banks and almost 60 basis
points lower for the largest deposit-driven banks compared with all smaller banks. Thus,
in sharp contrast to the strong asset size effect seen on ROE, NIM ratios show little evi-
dence that smaller community banks are disadvantaged. In fact, there is some evidence
that smaller community banks have higher NIMs than their larger brethren, an observa-
tion consistent with the view that smaller banks are more likely engaged in relationship
lending, which provides them a niche to operate with relatively larger margins. 
One factor that drives NIM is the reliance on core deposits, which are not as rate-
sensitive as other funding sources. Medians for core deposits-to-assets ratios, shown
in Figure 5, reveal dramatic differences. First, note the sharp drop in the ratio for C
Corp banks as asset size increases. Not surprisingly, core deposits make up 20 per-
cent to 40 percent less of funding for the largest banks than for smaller loan-driven
and deposit-driven banks. The difference in average funding costs also increases with
29 ECONOMIC REVIEW First Quarter 2005
17. Net interest margin (NIM) is defined as interest income minus interest expense as a fraction of
earning assets. Interest spread is measured as the average yield on earning assets minus the aver-
age interest cost of interest-bearing liabilities. NIM will increase relative to the spread as a bank
obtains proportionately more funding from non-interest-bearing sources of funds, ceteris paribus.




































































































































Core Deposits to Average Total Assets, 1998–2002
Source: BankSearch; Sheshunoff Information Services Inc.30 ECONOMIC REVIEW First Quarter 2005
bank size, suggesting that community banks are also more engaged in relationship
deposit gathering than their larger bank counterparts. Second, note that core
deposits are generally higher for Subchapter S banks of similar size compared with C
Corp banks. A critical component of Subchapter S banks’ financial success is the
strong reliance on cheap, stable core deposits. Finally, note that core deposits con-
tribute proportionately more to the funding of Subchapter S banks with more than
$1 billion in assets—admittedly a very small group, with only six banks in our sample—
than they do in smaller banks.
18
A key difference in aggregate net interest income thus appears to be attributable
to the deposit mix. The same general relationship holds for the interest spread, which
is not reported. This evidence is consistent with our argument that small banks are
more involved in relationship banking.
Noninterest income and noninterest expense. In addition to net interest
income, another driver of profitability is a bank’s ability to generate noninterest
income while controlling noninterest expense. Figure 6 demonstrates that the median
values of noninterest income as a fraction of total assets increase with size for C
Corps, with a dramatic jump occurring for banks with more than $10 billion in assets.
It would appear that the largest banks in the country are relying on noninterest
income much more than the community banks are. For C Corps, loan-driven banks
generate slightly higher fees relative to assets except for the largest banks. No clear
size relationship is evident at Subchapter S banks. Noninterest income increases with
asset size up to $500 million and then decreases except for deposit-driven banks with
$1 billion to $10 billion in assets, which reported a sharply higher median ratio.
The pattern for noninterest (overhead) expense as a fraction of assets in Figure 7
appears to be quite stable for C Corps. As expected, loan-driven banks report con-
sistently higher ratios compared with deposit-driven banks. Higher ratios reflect the
higher cost of loan officers and loan administration expense. The ratio is high for the
smallest banks versus other community banks with less than $1 billion in assets and
increases modestly with size for banks with more than $100 million in assets. C Corp




































































































































Total Noninterest Income to Average Total Assets, 1998–2002
Source: BankSearch; Sheshunoff Information Services Inc.banks with assets over $10 billion reported higher overhead costs relative to assets
versus all community banks. Thus, community banks seem to benefit relative to larger
banks from lower overhead costs in apparent contradiction of scale and scope
economies. Of course, this comparison ignores the linkage between overhead costs
and noninterest income. 
Interestingly, the ratio of noninterest expense to assets declines with size for
Subchapter S banks that are loan driven but generally increases with size for deposit-
driven banks. The ratio likely reflects the cost of operating branch networks, which
increases with the number of bank branches and offices. Importantly, community
banks with under $1 billion in assets benefit from lower overhead costs, on average.
Efficiency ratio. Figure 8 illustrates the effects of combining noninterest
expense with the ability to generate net operating revenue, defined as net interest
income plus noninterest income, in the reported efficiency ratio. This ratio shows a
robust pattern for loan-driven banks. It is highest for the smallest banks and declines
with bank asset size regardless of tax status.
19 Large loan-driven Subchapter S banks
with more than $1 billion in assets have a median efficiency ratio around 45 percent—
far below that of all other banks. For deposit-driven C Corp banks, the efficiency ratio
exhibits a U-shaped pattern, initially falling for community banks as size exceeds
$100 million in assets. The efficiency ratio rises beyond the $1 billion benchmark for
community banks. The ratio is fairly stable for all deposit-driven Subchapter S banks,
ranging from 58 cents to 62 cents per $1 of net operating revenue, regardless of size. 
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18. It is interesting to note that the business model of some of the largest banks dramatically affects
the relationship between core deposits and total assets. For example, Bank of America NA USA
in Phoenix, Arizona, has a loan-to-deposit ratio of 127,268 percent while Merrill Lynch B&TC in
Plainsboro, New Jersey, has a loan-to-deposit ratio of only 2.81 percent.
19. A bank’s efficiency ratio is measured as overhead expense, which includes personnel, occupancy,
and other operating costs, as a fraction of net operating revenue, which equals the sum of net
interest income and noninterest income.
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Total Overhead Expenses to Average Total Assets, 1998–2002
Source: BankSearch; Sheshunoff Information Services Inc.32 ECONOMIC REVIEW First Quarter 2005
Among community banks, loan-driven institutions exhibit higher efficiency
ratios than do similar-sized deposit-driven community banks, except for Subchap-
ter S banks with more than $300 million in assets. Thus, community bank efficiency
appears to improve with size except for larger Subchapter S banks. Within the smallest-
sized category, C Corp banks show the greatest inefficiencies regardless of loan or
deposit focus.
Compared with community banks, larger loan-driven banks report lower efficiency
ratios, reflecting a greater ability to generate noninterest income, particularly fees asso-
ciated with nontraditional banking activities. Apparently, deposit-driven large banks do
not reap the gains from fee income relative to overhead costs. Median large loan-driven
banks pay 2 to 14 cents less per $1 of net operating revenue than community banks do,
a pattern that has a substantive impact on these large banks’ ROA.
Credit risk measures. A common criticism of community banks is that they
have limited geographic diversification, which leads to greater relative credit risk. The
following ratios provide some information regarding credit risk exposure, albeit with
limited data.
Consider the loan charge-off ratios provided in Figure 9. Even though smaller
banks’ loan portfolios are less diversified geographically and by industry, this addi-
tional risk does not appear in their loan charge-off patterns over the 1998–2002 period.
Specifically, for both C and S Corp banks, charge-offs as a fraction of loans increase
with size. Clearly, the median values are at relatively low levels, indicating that in
relatively good times community banks benefit proportionately more from strong
asset quality. The relatively high charge-off rates for the largest banks likely reflect
credit card banks and banks with higher proportions of commercial and industrial
loans that charge off far more than banks with other asset concentrations. Credit
card banks typically use credit-scoring models to “transactionalize” credit card loans.
The higher charge-offs may also signify greater risk if larger banks extended more
credit to subprime borrowers.
20 The smallest community banks generally do not credit
score individual loans and thus are generally more selective in the type of consumer







































































































































Source: BankSearch; Sheshunoff Information Services Inc.loans they make. Of course, credit card lending makes up a small portion of loan port-
folios at most community banks.
The implication of these patterns is that banks of different sizes use different
models for success. In addition, the larger equity-capital-to-asset ratios at many small
banks suggest that owners and management are less willing to expose the bank to the
risk of insolvency even in times of good asset quality. Note the sharply lower charge-
off ratios at Subchapter S banks over the period. Generally, these institutions are
more closely held and have fewer agency problems. Perhaps for this reason
Subchapter S banks have operated with much lower loan losses in recent years.
21
Noncurrent loans and the loan-loss allowance. Figure 10 reports nonper-
forming loans across banks. Careful review suggests that deposit-driven and loan-
driven community banks (with less than $1 billion in assets) report similar medians over
the five-year period. For C Corps, nonperforming loans for community banks are well
below those reported by banks with more than $1 billion in assets. Nonperforming
loans are similarly a smaller fraction of gross loans at deposit-driven community banks.
For Subchapter S banks, medians for nonperforming loans as a fraction of gross loans
are comparable to those for C Corps for banks with less than $500 million in assets.
However, the seven deposit-driven Subchapter S banks report a higher median ratio
versus loan-driven banks with $300 million to $500 million in assets. Deposit-driven
Subchapter S banks with more than $500 million in assets report much lower median
ratios of nonperforming loans compared with similar-sized loan-driven banks. In fact,
only the largest Subchapter S banks, with more than $1 billion in assets, report a high
ratio. Thus, community banks have generally experienced better asset quality than
33 ECONOMIC REVIEW First Quarter 2005
20. Even with relatively high charge-off rates, credit card banks report the highest average ROAs in
recent years, indicating that they appear to have adequately priced the risk of loss. See the FDIC’s
Web site (www.fdic.gov) for the most recent data.
21. The pattern for loan-loss provisions tracks that for net loan charge-offs across the different cat-
egories of banks.





































































































































Net Charge-Offs to Average Loans, 1998–2002
Source: BankSearch; Sheshunoff Information Services Inc.34 ECONOMIC REVIEW First Quarter 2005
larger banks in recent years, and deposit-driven banks have reported the lowest levels
of nonperforming loans. 
Data for the median loan-loss reserve as a fraction of nonperforming loans
appear in Figure 11. For all categories, the ratio far exceeds 100 percent, indicating
that these ratios are at strong levels given historical trends. Still, except for the one
Subchapter S deposit-driven bank with more than $1 billion in assets, the largest
banks reported lower loss reserve allowance ratios, indicating smaller loan-loss pro-
visions over time relative to charge-offs compared with community banks. The rela-
tively lower provisions, in turn, are consistent with reporting higher ROAs.
Interestingly, loan-loss reserve ratios increase with size for loan-driven and deposit-
driven C Corp community banks and exhibit the same pattern for Subchapter S banks
except for loan-driven banks with more than $500 million in assets. The implication
is that the smallest banks realize higher ROAs associated with lower loan-loss provi-
sions over time.
Summary, Conclusions, and Implications
Many individuals view banks as homogeneous financial intermediaries. This article
argues that such a view is misleading because the more numerous smaller community
banks in the United States operate very differently than larger commercial banks.
This research describes recent performance and risk assessment data for FDIC-
insured banks across different size categories, different tax structures, and across
different asset concentration categories. We find evidence that small banks were gen-
erally profitable over recent years. Only the smallest community banks appear to
have significant operating inefficiencies. Above the smallest size category, community
banks have performed well, in many cases better than the larger banks, in managing
their net interest margins. 
On the other hand, noninterest income is not as important for community banks,
and it is unclear whether the generation of more noninterest income represents as
good a risk-return trade-off for all community banks as it does for the larger banks
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA 



































































































































Nonperforming Loans to Gross Loans, 1998–2002
Source: BankSearch; Sheshunoff Information Services Inc.in the country. Smaller banks also generally operate with more equity capital as a
funding source, which lowers ROE relatively, and have more core deposits, which
increase ROA relatively. Interestingly, credit risk measures also suggest that smaller
institutions have managed credit risks at least as well as the largest banks in the
United States. The evidence also shows, not surprisingly given the restrictions on
the number of shareholders, that community banks are more likely to adopt the
Subchapter S tax status that allows an institution to avoid direct federal income
taxation and pass tax benefits on to shareholders. These institutions have rela-
tively higher ROEs and ROAs because they pay no direct federal income taxes but
pass this obligation on to shareholders. 
Many of these observed differences occur primarily because community banks
focus relatively more attention on relationship banking while large commercial banks
focus more on transactional banking. We emphasize differences in performance and
risk bearing based on traditional transactional banking versus relationship banking
and generally associate higher interest rate spreads and greater profitability per loan
with relationship banking. As commercial banks grow in size, they appear to find it
more difficult to maintain an effective relationship focus. Community banks concen-
trate their efforts on customers with personal loan and deposit relationships that are
generally profitable and stable over time. It is this focus that better differentiates
strong versus weaker performance. 
As of the end of 2002, most community banks were well positioned in terms of
profitability and reported limited credit risk exposure. These trends are likely just as
strong today. Yet the ability to sustain and improve historical performance will
depend on how well managers find valuable relationship lending niches, invest bank
capital, and balance asset quality with growth.
35 ECONOMIC REVIEW First Quarter 2005
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA 

































































































































Loan-Loss Reserve to Nonperforming Assets, 1998–2002
Source: BankSearch; Sheshunoff Information Services Inc.36 ECONOMIC REVIEW First Quarter 2005
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